Southern Africa: consolidation or fragmentation: territorially, nation states and the border question: the case of Swaziland by Russon, R.
DEMOCRACY
1 3 - 1 5 JULY 1994
UNIVERSITY OF THE WITWATERSRAND
HISTORY WORKSHOP
SOUTHERN AFRICA:CONSOLIDATION OR FRAGMENTATION:
TERRITORIALLY, NATION STATES AND THE BORDER QUESTION
THE CASE OF SWAZILAND
R. Russon
. Department of Sociology
University of the Witwatersrand
SOUTHERN AFRICA: CONSOLIDATION OR FRAGMENTATION: TERRITORIALLY,
NATION 8TATES AND TEE BORDER QUESTION - TBS CASE OF SWAZILAND
BY:R. RUSSON
DEFT. OF SOCIOLOGY
UNIVERSITY OF WITWATERSRAND
P.O. WITS 2050
SOUTH AFRICA
GLOBALIZATION: CONSOLIDATION AND FRAGMENTATION
The world has become, in important respects, a single
social system, as a result of growing ties of
interdependence which now virtually affect everyone.
The global system is not just an environment within
which particular societies ... develop and change.
The social, political and economic connections which
cross-cut borders between countries decisively
condition the fate of those living within each of
them. The general term for the increasing dependence
of world society is globalization (Giddens 1989:520).
Globalization should not be seen as a uni-linear and uni-
dimerisional process which can be explained only in terms of
consolidation and continuous interdependence. Such a conception
would lead us into a fallacious assumption that globalization as
a process can or would be complete or that it would come to ah
end. This is because globalization is a multi-farious process
with many dimensions which include a process of consolidation and
fragmentation. The intention here is not, however, to
counterpoise the two processes in a dialectical fashion whereby
fragmentation could be held as an anti-thesis of consolidation
but to view them as integral elements complementing each other
at different moments in different forms.
The process of consolidation and fragmentation is very well
represented in the history of Europe (because of its well
documented nature) whereby as Europe consolidated itself there
was a rise and fall of empires (which X describe elsewhere as
hegemony and decline see Russon 1993) for example the Roman
Empire, Ottoman Empire, Habsburg Empire, United Provinces of the
Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain (see Held 1992,
Chase-Dunn 1989 and wallerstein 1984). Global consolidation saw
the emergence of the United states and later the Union of Soviet
and Socialist Republic as world powers thus ushering the world
into a bi-polar system. This marked an important era in the
consolidation of the world system so did it for its
fragmentation.
The period of American hegemony which Wallerstein (1984) describes
as the beginning of a crisis for the global system marked a
beginning of a period when "hegemony itself became a fragmented
process, a process whereby the locus of power in the world system
no longer rests in one cubicle but is spread among countries and
certain institutions' although with a visible hegemonic structure
the US (Russon 1993). Giddens (1989: 520) stated that "it would
be a mistake to think of globalization simply as a process of
growth of world unity". Globalization, I contend is "unity of
disunity; a unity of fragmentation"
TERRITORIALITY AND NATION STATES
One important difference between hegemonies or empires of the
pre-capitalist era and the present world order is the
organisation of the state. Hegemonies at that stage meant
physical occupation and domination.by a single overarching state
apparatus which made territorial claim under one unity. With the
emergence of the modern global system there was a disintegration
of these empires and a creation of an interstate system. This
process of the fragmentation of the state into smaller nation
states with defined territorial claims was at the same time a
process of consolidation of the world system because it would
have been impossible to have an overarching state powerful enough
to impose imperium over the globe. The global system had to
consolidate itself through a fragmentary process (Russon 1193).
By the end of the 17th century, for example, Europe was no longer
a mosaic of states because as each state consolidated its
sovereignty and territory it meant that it had to respect the
sovereignty of its neighbour and as a result, as Giddens (1985)
stated "consolidated independent sovereignty of each individual
state was at the same time part of a process of overall inter-
state integration" (cf Held 1992:85). This new fragmented order
of states referred to as the "international society of states"
or the Westphalian model after the Peace of Westphalia of 1648
(ibid) has become an integral institutional structure of the
global system.
In Africa like the rest of the colonised world, boundaries were
imposed through agreements between colonial masters-without any
consultation with the indigenous people in the majority of cases.
.Boundary- delimiting in African was largely influenced by the
balance of power between the contending colonial powers. For
example, the British managed to get away with large territory for
Tanganyika whilst Belgium received a smaller piece for Rwanda.
Lakes, rivers and mountains were used to delimit boundaries with
little regard to other forms of national symbols and identities.
This could possibly been based on a Eurocentric bias at the time
that Africans were just tribes without national symbols and
identities.
The following examples are to demonstrate the potential magnitude
of the boundary problem in Africa.
The boundary between South Africa and Swaziland was agreed upon
between the British and the Boer Administration of the Transvaal
in 1881 through the Pretoria Convention and Swaziland lost some
territory. The boundary between South Africa and Lesotho was
agreed upon by the two colonialists in 1869 through the Sand
River Convention, and Lesotho lost between 30 and 50 miles of
territory (Prescott 1987:252). The boundary between Mozambique
and South Africa was agreed upon by Portugal and the British in
1869 using the Lubombo mountains as the boundary line (ibid).
British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland were united to form the
Republic of Somalia in July 1960 bringing together people with
different histories and languages.
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British Togoland was united with the Gold Coast in March 1957 to
form the independent state of Ghana bringing an end to the Anglo-
Gennan boundary which separated the two. The British Cameroons,
north and south were split into two with the north joining
Nigeria and the south joining the French Cameroon in 1960 (ibid).
This shows that the consolidation of territory and sovereignty
in Africa has been a complex process whereby national symbols and
identities were created after the nation state not before. This
has caused severe problems for the nation state in Africa because
it could not command sufficient legitimacy and control over its
subjects and this can be used to explain why most African states
resorted to despotic methods of governance.
As a result of the complexity of the border problem, the OAU
Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its first Ordinary
Session, held in Cairo on 17-21 July 1964 raised the question of
boundaries and agreed that;
Considering that the border problems constitute a grave
and permanent factor of dissension; conscious of the
existence of extra-African manoeuvres aiming at dividing
the African States; considering further that the borders of
African states, on the day of their independence,
constitute a tangible reality;....; solemnly declares that
all Member States pledge themselves to respect the
frontiers existing on their achievement of national
independence. SARS 1982.
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BOUNDARY PROBLEMS AND A NEW SOUTH AFRICA
The process of political transition through negotiations in South
Africa was confounded with the problem of the nature of the
state; federal or unitary. Both models required a process of
boundary domestic demarcation since the latter model proposed a
strong regionalism as well. The reincorporation of the homelands
was no doubt a hot issue as some resisted and wanted to chart a
sovereign way forward. All this demonstrated the volatility and
delicacy of the question of space, ethnicity, power and
sovereignty. Little if any mention was made of the boundary
problem with the neighbouring countries.
On the basis of the above declaration by the OAU it can be
assumed that South Africa's neighbouring states would not lay any
claims to land. The.OAU declaration does not however stand in
the way of amicable and peaceful means to reach an acceptable
settlement on the border question.
The Swazi case stands out as an obvious one where land claims
will be put forward. King Mswati III, successor of sobhuza II
who initiated the process and died in 1982 having failed to
achieve it, declared recently that "we won't rest until we get
KaNgwane" (Swazi Observer 7/10/1993). The new Government of Prime
Minister Ntsu Mokhehle of the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) in
Lesotho, on the other hand, told visiting South African Foreign
Minister Pik Botha recently that they wanted their conquered
territory, the Orange Free State back (ibid) while Botswana holds
the view that the Tswana people were separated by the British who
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wrongly drew the borders thus leaving out a section of the Tswana
nation in South Africa.
"Botswana has laid claims to the western Transvaal
including the towns of Mafikeng, Zeerust and Rustenburg,
the latter of the three being the richest town in. the
western Transvaal because of the steel mining operations"
(Swazi Observer 7/10/93).
Pik Botha's response to Mokhehle's demand was that the issue will
be decided by a new Government in a post-apartheid South Africa.
The case of the Walvis Bay which Namibia rightfully claimed and
received from South Africa is a case in point to reflect a
process already in motion.
The case of the BLS states is a clear representation of the
problem around the border question in post-colonial Africa.
Although sharing a common descent which can be confirmed by their
linguistic codes, the southern African community had already
started showing some elements of fragmentation at the time of
colonialism although statehood and territorially were in the
process of being consolidated. But because the consolidation of
national identities and nation states was interfered with from
outside the whole process of nation building was bastardised
reflecting the interests of the colonisers than the subjects of
the region.
The boundary problem in Africa remains the most elusive and
explosive question for the coming century and unless handled with
the delicacy it deserves regional conflicts might be difficult
to contain. The Rwandan situation is exemplary of the problems
of imposed nation building in Africa whereby peoples who did not
belong together were brought together and people who belonged
together were separated without their consent. The delicacy of
the boundary problem in Africa might require an urgent redress
of the 1964 position adopted by the OAU, an update to review its
relevance in a changing situation.
DEMOCRACY AND THE RIGHT 07 CHOICE AND SELF DETERMINATION
The democratic wave sweeping through the continent is bound to
catapult to the fore some very crucial questions which during the
era of repressive governance were seen as prerogative of the
people in power. Political and national symbols of the
repressive era are bound to disintegrate and new ones developed.
As discussed by Goulbourne (1988), many African states believed
in one party state governance because they argued that it
promoted national unity and that multi-party state governance was
divisive and of European origin. Kaunda ruled Zambia on the
slogan "One Zambia One Nation". After his fall from power many
people could not continue to express such a sentiment because it
reminded them of the antiquated past, a past many would not want
to remember. People are advocating their rights as enshrined in
the UN Declaration, right of choice and self determination.
Tilly (1975, 1993) suggested that the, end of wars leads
invariably to changes not only in territorial boundaries , but
national identities and nation states. I would like to add that
social transition invariably leads to fundamental changes in
people's perceptions. Globally, the end of the Cold War ushered
new phenomena in terms of people's perceptions about themselves,
their space, their identities etc which saw the collapse of the
giant Soviet Union, the collapse of Yugoslavia etc. In Africa,
the transition to liberal democracy is already showing signs of
changes in people's views about themselves and their identities.
If this thesis is anything to go by one would not be straying off
the point to assume that Southern Africa will experience major
shifts in national boundaries and national identities with the
resolution of the national question in South Africa.
THE BALANCE OF POWER
An important aspect of this thesis, as advanced by Giddens, is
the fact that boundary delimitation normally reflects the balance
of power at a given time. South Africa is today a major economic
power in the sub-region regardless of the political problems it
has gone through. The BLS states presently depend on South
Africa for a variety of imports and markets for their goods. For
example 99% of Lesotho's imports come from South Africa and over
80% of her exports go there (Hoohlo 1990).
The labour market is another very significant area in this regard
whereby Swaziland has about one fifth of its labour force as
migrants in South Africa whilst Lesotho sends over two third.
It should be noted here that the cooperation that has existed
between the BLS states even during the apartheid era reflects the
economic imbalance and the indispensability of the South African
linkage. In many ways the relationship between these countries
was like that of a federal republic whereby there was a common
currency, a common market i.e., the Customs Union and the grants
given by Pretoria to the other member states were a meaningful
source of income in real terms without which the budget of
Swaziland and most importantly Lesotho would be very negligible.
Economic integration in the sub-region is a reality that occurred
a long time ago especially with the agreement between the British
colonial administration in the three Protectorates and the Onion
of South Africa on June 29, 1910 allowing for a Customs Union
with the understanding that the Protectorates would eventually
be incorporated into South Africa (Hoohlo 1990).
It is within the above factors that choices would have to be made
between border adjustments, integration or cooperation or even
incorporation.
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TERRITORIALITY AND NATION BUILDING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA;
It is not true that at the dawn of colonialism in Africa there .
was no process of state formation or nation building. This can
clearly be demonstrated by a process of state formation in
Southern Africa which involved wars and the movement of people.
The Mfecane is an important historical fact to demonstrate that
indeed the question of territoriality was becoming an important
issue around which people could be mobilised and state formation
be based. The example of the Zulu kingdom and its military
prowess in the sub-region is another important indicator of the
formation of nation states although at an early stage.
The consolidation of the Zulu kingdom under Shaka was a very
important development towards the whole question of
territoriality and state formation. This is because as Giddens
pointed out that, the consolidation of independent sovereignty
of each individual state is at the same time part of a process
of overall inter-state integration, (c.f. D Held I?9j2:85). This
means that once a single state delimits its boundaries i.e. of
territorial consolidation it has to recognise the existence of
other boundaries and in this way it at the same time helps in the
• • • • • • • • - • . • • .. • - . ' • • • • : ; n o - \ •.! ' • > • • • • • • • /
consolidation of other states.
• ; . ' - ; ' ; i ! • • • • • • • - .
The Swazi state had started to consolidate itself around the time
of the wars of Shaka and the Zulu. It was at this time that
• • • -
1 \ •
territorial boundaries started being an issue as Shaka was bent
on conquering territory and people. Territoriality only becomes
an issue once there is a threat of invasion.
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The process of state consolidation in Southern Africa was closely
related to the concept of national identities in the form of
language, culture, common origin etc.
Colonialism interrupted and altered the process of endogenic
state formation and nation building in Southern Africa as it did
in the rest of the continent. As a result most African nations
today can not effectively be defined in terms of national
identities, language or common origin thus complicating even
further' our understanding of the concept nation. The only
definition that is left in place is statehood, territoriality and
in the majority of cases colonial history.
Charles Tilly in his numerous writings on this subject (see
Tilly: 1975 and 1993) has argued that statehood and territoriality
are in most cases subject to wars and that the settlement of war
provides an occasion for modifying the international system and
national boundaries to reflect the new balance of forces. New
states come into being as old ones disappear (Tilly 1993:9).
In Africa like the rest of the colonised world, boundaries were
agreed upon between the colonial masters and boundaries reflected
the balance of power between the contending colonial powers. For
example, the British managed to get away with large portions of
territory for Tanganyika whilst the Belgians received smaller a
piece for Rwanda (Prescott 1987)
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In Southern Africa, I will argue that, indeed wars and political
changes have had and will continue to have a tremendous impact
on the question of statehood and territorially.
The Anglo-Boer conflicts in Southern Africa can be singled out
to have been the most decisive of factors with regard to
territorial sovereignty and statehood. For example the boundary
between South Africa and Lesotho through the Sand River
Convention between the Boer administration of the Orange Free
State and the British administration of the Cape, the boundary
between Swaziland and South Africa was agreed upon through the
Pretoria Convention between the British Government and the• Boer
administration in the Transvaal.
Due to the uncertainty over the status of Swaziland except' as a
buffer zone to stop the Boers from advancing to Kosi Bay, the
administration of Swaziland kept changing hands between the
British and the Boers of the Transvaal in South Africa. In
December 1894, for example, the British gave Swaziland back to
Boer administration in the Transvaal until the outbreak of the
Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) and the defeat of the Boers resulting
in the annexation of the Transvaal. Through the Order in Council
of June 25, 1903 Swaziland was placed under British
administration. This meant that Swaziland was now to be
administered by the British administration of the Transvaal. On
the 1st of October 1904 Lord' Milner exercising the powers
conferred upon him by the Order in Council issued the Swaziland
Administration Proclamation whereby, inter alia, the laws of the
Transvaal were mutatis mutandis, and as far as applicable,
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declared in force in Swaziland and were to be administered as if
Swaziland were a district of the Transvaal. Swaziland was for
all intents and purposes on the way to incorporation into the
Transvaal (Mashasha 1974). In December 1, 1906 however,
Swaziland was disannexed from the Transvaal as South Africa was
moving towards the Union in 1910.
It is on the basis of the 1906 Order in Council that Swaziland
can be said to have finally lost the pieces of land to the
Transvaal and became a British colony until independence in 1968.
THE SWAZILAND CASE
PROFXLBt
Size 17 369.4 km. sq.
SOCIAL
Population
Population Growth
Population Structure
Projections
Youth.
WprKing Population
712 694 in 1986
3.4% per annum
97% indigenous, 3% of South
African and Mozambican origins.
1 093 000 people by year 2 000
60% is less than 20 years of age
100 000
LANGUAGE Swati; a dialect of Zulu
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ECONOMIC
Currency
Trade Deficit
Foreign Debt
Foreign Official Reserves
Inflation
Sales Tax
Highest Revenue Earner
Imports
Emalangeni = S.A. Rand =3,3 US. $
E 109.7 million (1992) •'  :
E 585 million
E 63.6 million (1992)
1 1 % • • • • • • . . • ••:
1 0 % • • • • - -
Sugar , . .
90% from South Africa
POLITICAL
System
Head of State
Head of Government
Cabinet Ministers
Parliament
Tinkhundla
Monarch
Prime Minister (appointed)
all appointed by the King
Two Chamber (elected & appointed).
LEGAL
System Dual; Roman Dutch Law and
Customary Law
Swaziland is a small country located between the north-eastern
part of South Africa and Mozambique. The history of the Swazi
people is difficult to capture due to the movement of people in
the sub-region in the 17th and 18th centuries.
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It is however a noted fact that the Swazi are a close relative
of the Zulu and this is demonstrated by the language and cultural
traditions. Well known Swazi historian Matsebula tends to base
Swazi history solely on the ruling Dlamini clan but does however
confirm the fact that continued relations were maintained with
the Zulu during the period of state formation in Swaziland.
Matsebula's history indicates that the Dlamini clan originated
from the Tembe in Mozambique. It should however be noted that
the Tembe are presently split between Mozambique and South Africa
around the Ngwavuma area. I therefore suspect that the Dlamini
had a stronger leaning towards the Zulu than the Tsonga. This
piece of information is important in trying to understand why
Swaziland is claiming the Ngwavuma area.
SWAZILAND-SOOTH AFRICAN LAND DEAL;
Swaziland attained its independence on September 6, 1968 through
a Westminster type of constitution without a settlement of the
territorial boundary leaving many Swazis in South Africa. The
first independence elections of 1967 put the traditionalist
King's party the Imbokodvo National Movement in Parliament with
no seat for the opposition. The period between 1968 and 1973 was
a period of consolidation for traditionalist policies in
Swaziland and the slight upset at the polls in 1972 which gave
the opposition Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) only
three seats in Parliament was sufficient to persuade the King to
declare the constitution un-Swazi and repeal it on April 12,
1973. This is an important development in terms of trying to
understand the politics of post independent Swaziland and in
particular the question of border adjustments. The repeal of the
constitution and the introduction of a state of emergency
elevated the monarch into a position of absolutism. The
opposition to absolutist rule beginning in the late 1970s made
the monarch feel a bit insecure in terms of its domestic base and
therefore sought legitimacy and support from outside. South
Africa was the most possible ally, Mozambique on the other hand
was not easily accessible because it had just obtained its
independence from Portugal in 1975 and had adopted a socialist
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model.
On the other hand Swaziland was an important Cold War buffer zone
between communist Mozambique and capitalist-apartheid South
Africa more especially because Machel in Mozambique had committed
himself to assist the liberation struggle in South Africa. The
liberation movem'ent was given the opportunity to have operational
offices in Mozambique and the infiltration of guerillas was on.
the increase.
It is on the basis of the above political developments that we
can try to locate and even understand the land deal between South
Africa and Swaziland in 1982.
WHY LAND DEAL?
"With the degree of secrecy surrounding the Swaziland South
African land deal, and the extent of conscious manipulation
of the media and the facts, it is impossible to come to any
final and confident conclusions on some of the puzzling
aspects of the issue.11 (SAKS 1982:3)
The initial Swazi claim for the disputed territory was made in
the 1960s although at the time South Africa's position was more,
towards the incorporation of the BLS states. •
The land deal between South Africa and Swaziland came at a time
when South Africa was battling with the question of homelands to
try and prolong apartheid policies by dividing communities on the
basis of ethnicity. Giving away pieces of land that had been cut
out for Swazi speaking people was more in line with this
strategy.
South Africa was experiencing unemployment problems as many
workers were retrenched due to the recession and the
mechanisation of agri-business. This superfluity of labour was
reaching a crisis point and it seemed easier to embark on a
strategy of exporting it.
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The question of a buffer zone between Mozajnbique and South Africa
was possibly another reason whereby a longer stretch of buffer
would be more workable. This was more of a security question and
coupled with the signing of the secret Pretoria Accord between
Swaziland and South Africa in 1982 one can sustain this argument.
The Pretoria Accord was a security agreement between the two
countries whereby they both committed themselves to combating
insurgency and it is widely speculated that the land deal was to
be some form of compensation for effective control of ANC
combatants from entering South Africa. It came as little
surprise that the Swaziland Government actually engaged ANC
combatants military in 1983/4 whereby some were actually killed
and others handed over to Pretoria, similar to what they had done
in Mozambique during the liberation struggle.
Although Swaziland had made land claims in the 1960s the question
is about the timing of these claims. It is speculated that the
land locked kingdom could have wanted to have access to the
Indian Ocean through Kosi bay which had not been developed by the
South African government in favour of Richards Bay. Although not
clear what function this bay would have served for Swaziland it
is speculated that it would have served a military function with
the USA providing both the enormous capital and expertise needed,
as well as the warships. (SARS 1982). Although the US state
department denied such involvement it is clear that the Swazis
could not have been able to develop a harbour like Kosi bay
without the assistance of an economic power and moreover there
was speculation that the USA was to its Indian Ocean base at
Diego Garcia, (ibid).
This land deal actually meant that Swaziland would be importing
a total of about 850 000 people with barren, less productive and
scattered pieces of land (see map on annex. I).
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On June 18, 1982 proclamations in the Government Gazette of South
Africa
 fformally abolished the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly
(KNLA) and excised the Ingwavuma district from the administration
of the Kwazulu Legislative Assembly (KLA) in preparation for the
transfer to Swaziland.
KANGWANE
The dissolution of the KaNgwane Legislative Assembly was a
product of intense struggle between the South African Government
and the people of KaNgwane involving lengthy meetings and a
petition signed by 17 chiefs rejecting incorporation (SARS
1982:7). Incorporation had initially been supported by only two
chiefs in KaNgwane but over time the number increased as the
Government continued to lobby, for example, in February 1982 Dr.
Piet Koornhof who was, then Minister for Co-operation and
Development (CAD) tried to sell unification with a great deal of
money for development (ibid).
Two factions had emerged around this question of unification, one
led by Enos Mabuza then Chief Executive Councillor for KaNgwane
and the other led by David Lukhele who had previously rejected
unification. The Mabuza faction rejected incorporation on the
basis that they would lose many their right they had struggled
for in South Africa;
Mabuza further stated that Swaziland's political system was not
suitable because it did not allow for an opposition and that
unemployment was rife. (SAKS 1982)
Mabuza demanded a referendum to decide the question of
incorporation which was rejected by Pretoria.
Lukhele on the other hand argued that incorporation would allow
for "an acceptable citizenship of a politically stable country,
an escape from Bantu education, and economic advantages." (cf
SARS op cit).
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The issue was ended when Mabuza took it to the Supreme court and
the South African Government decided to reach a settlement out
of court putting the matter to rest.
XHGWAVUMA
INgwawuna falls under Kwazulu in Natal and from the very onset
there was. clear rejection of incorporation. The claim of the
INgwavuma area is closely related to the fact that the ruling
Dlamini clan in Swaziland is said to have originated front the
Tembe tribe situated around the present borderline between
Swaziland, Mozambique and South Africa. The Tembe tribe was
divided by boundary demarcation in such a way that some went into
Mozambique and others remained in South Africa (SARS op cit) .
Because Swaziland had targeted Kosi Bay in Natal, Sobhuza II
sent a delegation to Chief Tembe in 1978 asking him to secede
from Kwazulu. He was invited to go on a research tour to England
to get archival information to prove the claim on Tongaland (part
of Ingwavuma district). When confronted by the Kwazulu cabinet
in October 1978 on this issue Tembe confirmed the Swazi secret
initiative and from that day opposed incorporation (ibid).
Although having given his daughter to King Goodwill Zwelithini
in the mid 1970s Sobhuza's move had generated sufficient
hostility from the Zulu so much that when he sent a delegation
to Kwazulu on September, 14, 1979 the request for incorporation
was rejected outrightly (ibid).
Negotiations with Pretoria on the Ngwavuina area without the
consent of the Kwazulu cabinet did not. promise to deliver as the
voices of opposition started getting louder Chief Minister of
Kwazulu Gatsha Buthelezi actually threatened a violent backlash
if the negotiations proceeded regardless of the fact that he had
been promised some land in exchange of Ingwavuma. Buthelezi
argued that Ingwavuma had always been a Zulu area and that
Dingane was actually buried in the area.
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'• To emphasise his point he actually announced that a tombstone
would be erected in; memory of Diiigane in Ingwavuma, to emphasise
the Zulu territorial claims 'and to indicate to Swaziland how
"• sensitive an issue it would be to take over land where Dingane
was buried (SARS 1982:10).
On June 18, 1982 Ingwavuma was excised from Kwazulu in
preparation for the transfer to Swaziland regardless of the
rej ection and the matter was immediately taken to court by
Kwazulu Legislative Assembly.
On June 25, Justice Shearer ruled that the Ingwavuma deal was
illegal "on the grounds that insufficient consultation has been
done with the Kwazulu Cabinet" (cf SARS 1982:13). This judgement
put to rest the whole question of transfers of South Africa's
homelands to the independent neighbouring states of Botswana for
whom Bophut'atswana was earmarked, Lesotho for whom Qwagwa was
earmarked and Swaziland for whoa KaNgwane and Ingwavuma were
earmarked.
CONCLUSION : '
The above example has demonstrated the complexity and emotional
nature of the border question. The threat by then Chief Minister
Buthele2i, to invade Swaziland if the deal went through is
evidence of the potential riotous nature of this matter. In the
KaNgwane case tensions within the disputed territory emerged as
two contending parties were ready to fight it out. In Swaziland
as well there were divisions on the issue as university students
took to the streets in protest around 1982/83. Even the major
underground opposition the People's United Democratic Movement
(PUDEMO) rejected the land deal and privately endorsed closer
integration or even incorporation.
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Border adjustment or integration would mean a closer look at the
nature of the state in South Africa and the contending countries.
As already evident in the case of KaNgwane, issues of democratic
governance and human rights were raised by Mabuza in opposing
incorporation to Swaziland. The important question here becomes;
would the people in the disputed territories be willing to change
loyalty. What would this mean in terms of their rights and
possibilities of life chances. In a recent survey, the Star e.g.
reported that many Swazis in the disputed territory would not
want to be incorporated into Swaziland.
Would integration or corporation be meaningful under a federal,
confederal or unitary state and to what extent can the
neighbouring states influence such a process.
Border adjustments will without doubt be a very contentious issue
as observed by the OAU way back in 1964. A more contentious part
of border adjustments would involve claims for compensation and
reparations which in this case might not arise.
Cooperation would possibly not necessarily change the boundaries
except that structures and institutions of cooperation like the
SADC, SACU and the CMA would have to be reviewed in such a way
that would not lead to relations of super-ordination and
subordination.
The border question is one of the most sensitive of questions in
Africa and possibly the world today and will possibly become the
most contentious issue for the coming century. Swaziland's
initiative for border adjustments with apartheid South Africa was
frowned upon in the continent because she was dealing with an
illegitimate Government on very sensitive national issues and
most importantly because this attempt was seen as legitimising
South Africa's attempt at ethnic divisions.
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